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Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in Africa were one of the 
pledges of the Chinese government at the Forum on China-
Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) summit held in Beijing in 
November 2006. While the Chinese government sought 
opportunities for Chinese enterprises abroad, the 
establishment of economic and trade cooperation zones was 
part of the Chinese government's “going out” policy which 
encourages and assists domestic companies in developing a 
global strategy to exploit opportunities in the new market. 
After a bidding process, Egypt, Ethiopia, Mauritius, Nigeria 
and Zambia were finally selected to host Chinese-led SEZs. 
Most of the zones have not reached their full potential yet 
since some of them are still under construction and most of 
them are only partially operating. 
Since 2007 some progress has been made, starting with the 
Chambishi zone in Zambia. The Oriental zone in Ethiopia has 
recently started partial operation hosting a few 
manufacturing industries. Since the initiative was based on 
China’s own successful experience of SEZs, Chinese-led SEZs 
have attracted much attention and have become a testing 
ground for this new policy experiment. The success of 
Chinese-led SEZs is important for both China and for the 
African host countries. Chinese enterprises, which experience 
severe competition within China, can enter new markets. 
These markets are in African countries and beyond them, as 
SEZs benefit from trade preferences granted to host 
countries. Thus, country-of-origin labelling or the availability 
of a particular tariff preference programme might help 
Chinese enterprises access the US or the EU markets. These 
SEZ programmes are also hoped to establish a good image 
on the African continent, somewhat countering the image of 
a ‘predator trade partner’ seeking only natural resources. In 
this rationale, SEZs could – if successful – enhance its image 
as a benevolent partner and thus contribute to expanding 
China’s soft power.  
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The success of Chinese-led SEZs in Africa is important to both the Chinese government and the host 
governments. Even though these zones are operating under market conditions, the role of both sides in 
creating effective institutional arrangement for SEZs is crucial. The Chinese-led SEZ programme was ini-
tiated in 2006 and 2007, and was intended to be implemented before 2009. Even though the Chinese 
government and host governments showed their willingness to push forward SEZ programmes vigor-
ously, most of them have not materialised yet. Most of the SEZs have been under construction and are 
not yet operating. This paper first provides the brief background of the establishment of SEZs in Africa, 
then the focus moves to stakeholders involved in the programme. Finally, the paper explores the current 
situations and navigates the role of the host governments to make the SEZs work. To help the Chinese-
led SEZs in Africa to become successful, the host governments must remain actively involved in the 
SEZs, because their support is more significant than any other aspect. Furthermore, they should provide 
consistent policies and effective incentives for the investors. On the other hand, the host governments 
should impose firm requirements in terms of technology transfer and basic working conditions so that 
their countries can reap the benefits of Chinese investment.  
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SEZs are also expected to attract investment to the host 
countries and thereby help industrialisation, which, it is 
hoped, can contribute to diversification of the economies of 
African countries which are presently largely based on the 
extractive industry. The programmes are expected to 
stimulate the growth of host countries’ competitiveness. 
Technology transfer and job creation are further expected 
benefits. It is especially hoped that host governments can 
resolve unemployment issues, which are often one of the 
causes for instability in a country.  
Various actors are involved - but a lack of local 
involvement  
There are four main actors involved in the Chinese-led SEZs 
inAfrica. First of all, the Chinese government is one of the 
main drivers of the SEZ programme as they initiated the 
programme and provided financial and non-financial support 
for developers and investors. Various state agencies such as 
the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and the China-Africa 
Development Fund (CAD Fund) are involved in planning, 
promoting, marketing and attracting Chinese investors. 
MOFCOM is in charge of the bidding process, loans and 
subsidies. The CAD Fund, a government equity fund, plays a 
major role in promoting joint ventures involving Chinese and 
local investors.  
    The CAD Fund itself is the second largest shareholder in the 
Lekki Zone in Nigeria and the JinFei Zone in Mauritius. Other 
actors are the  Export-Import Bank of China and Chinese 
provincial governments as well as Chinese State-Owned 
Enterprises.  
Secondly, each zone operates under market mechanisms, it is 
important to scrutinise private and joint venture enterprises, 
because these Chinese private enterprises represent an 
increasing share of China’s FDI to Africa. A World Bank study 
of January 2013 illustrates that Chinese private investment in 
Africa has outnumbered Chinese state-owned enterprises by 
taking up 55% of the total Chinese investment. Chinese local 
businesses face severe competition within China itself. 
Additional local pressure is coming from the rising costs of 
production in China due to increasing labour costs and 
commodity prices. Under these circumstances, the idea of 
relocating businesses to Africa might seem wise to private 
enterprises. Yet the private Chinese investors are not having 
an easy time accessing many of the incentives that investors 
in state-owned businesses possess despite the former’s 
increasing involvement in businesses in Africa.  
Against this background, Chinese companies moving into the 
zones are eligible for a number of incentives, including the 
reimbursement of moving expenses, tax rebates, and others.  
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 Box 1: Types of zones 
 
There are various types of zones for different purposes such as export processing zones (EPZs), industrial development zones 
(IDZs), free zones, and industrial parks, among others. Especially, SEZs and EPZs are often used interchangeably. SEZs and 
EPZs are created by the governments with certain aims: 1) to attract the foreign investment 2) to develop infrastructure 3) to 
create jobs 4) to promote technology transfer. However, they differ in size, scope of business and objective and among others. 
EPZs are industrial estates aimed primarily at attracting export-oriented investments. SEZs are larger estates and usually cover 
all industrial and service sectors and target both foreign and domestic markets and generally open to all activities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Engman, M., O. Onodera and E. Pinali (2007), “Export Processing Zones: Past and Future Role in Trade and Development”, OECD Trade 
Policy Papers, No.53, OECD Publishing. 
 
 EPZs SEZs 
Main goals Promoting exports Overall development of the zones 
Main activities Manufacturing and other related activities All types of industry and services 
Physical 
characteristics 
Industrial park Entire province, region or municipality 
Infrastructure Manufacturing units only 
Manufacturing units, on/off site infrastructure and other 
services 
Forms of Investment Private foreign investors only Local investors are involved 
In addition to these direct incentives, cheap and abundant 
labour and easy access to local and international markets 
seem to be particularly attractive to Chinese investors.  
Thirdly, African host governments are supposed to play 
important roles. In reality, even though each host 
government has a different institutional environment, the 
host governments in general strive to create favourable 
environments for foreign investors. It has taken a long time 
for these SEZs to go into operation, which seems also to be 
related to a lack of push from the side of the host 
governments. However, except in the case of Nigeria, the 
host governments’ share in the SEZ is usually relatively 
small with up to 5%, or even – as in the cases of Ethiopia 
and Mauritius - non-existent.  
Lastly, local population is the major source of labour in the 
SEZs and thus a factor to consider. The SEZs have 
contributed to job creation but several problems are being 
experienced. These are often derived from the absence of 
related regulations in the host country itself, and the lack 
of skilled workers in the host countries. The first and 
foremost problems are related to minimum wages. Most 
workers earn less than the minimum wage they are entitled 
to. Most of the host countries have legal and regulatory 
frameworks but these are not full protection, not least so 
as the government implementation is inadequate.  
The current situation regarding the Chinese-led SEZs 
in Africa  
Most of zones have completed office buildings, internal 
roads, industrial and warehousing units. Their planned focus 
is on manufacturing, mainly light machinery and textiles. 
Chambishi is an exception to this: the zone was originally 
designed for copper and cobalt related industries as the 
zone lies in the Copper Belt. Some other countries such as 
Nigeria have modified their original plans, and are 
considering opening the SEZs to other sectors such as the 
service sector including property and banking. Since the first 
announcement of the establishment of zones, several 
problems in the operation have emerged. It is essential for 
host governments to design overarching schemes for SEZs, 
which need linkages to national development programmes 
in the first place. SEZ programmes will require enormous 
investment from the host governments, which makes the 
integration into long-term visions even more urgent. Host 
governments will, for instance, have to provide on/off site 
infrastructure, electricity and water connections. Cost-
benefit analysis and calculations regarding the countries’ 
own comparative advantages are thus advisable before the 
investments. It is also still unclear how SEZs in host 
countries relate to each other. If there is no macro 
coordination, the risk is for SEZs to increase the competition 
with enterprises in the host countries.  
Secondly the zones operate according to market mechanisms. 
Therefore, it is important to create a business friendly 
environment and set up institutional arrangement that can 
support investors. When a host country is seen as a high 
political risk, this discourages foreign investors and in order to 
secure investment, the host government has to compensate by 
making concessions.  
Thirdly, and closely related to the second point: even though it 
is important to attract foreign investors’ participation in the 
zones, local investors also need encouragement. Although most 
Chinese investors have enjoyed unprecedented support from 
both the Chinese side and the host governments, local 
businesses are, in most cases, excluded from incentives. In the 
case of Ethiopia, local businesses are not allowed to invest in 
the Chinese-led SEZs. There is thus a tendency to create SEZs 
as enclaves. Without spill-over from the zone, however, its 
implications will be limited. The Chinese domestic experiences 
show how important it is to synchronise the zone and local 
economy including local suppliers and local universities. One of 
the fundamental goals of FDI is to boost local competitiveness 
through active interaction with advanced foreign businesses. In 
this process, it is important to enhance and empower locals. 
Knowledge transfer only happens when the host countries’ 
technology level is similar to that of the home country. At the 
moment, the trend seems to be that most companies are in the 
labour intensive sector, rather than in technology intensive 
sectors. Host governments need to be aware that investors can 
ultimately move their businesses to another country, if the 
alternative country can provide labour at a more competitive, 
lower cost. The exclusive reliance on cheap labour is a risky 
strategy, as this competitive advantage is easily lost. Host 
governments thus would need to continuously invest in human 
capital, upgrading the skills of labour.  
Fourthly, inside the zones, the role of host governments is also 
significant. The host governments are responsible for 
monitoring the practice of investors. Issues regarding 
environment and labour practices have been pointed out as 
aspects that require special attention. However, in practice, 
these are often overlooked as host governments are usually 
more concerned about attracting foreign investors, not least so 
with a view to much needed job creation.  
In many cases, labour regulations in SEZs are different from 
those in host countries, for example, often there exist no 
specific regulations with regard to minimum wages, leave, 
training, and the rights of the association of workers’ unions. 
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This tendency is often described as a race to the bottom, 
lowering the living standards of the people in the host 
countries, if competition is with economic activities outside the 
SEZ.  
Conclusions and Recommendations  
The success of the SEZs depends on the conducive business 
and operational environment. In this regard the host 
government is the most significant actor in the project; as 
per usual, development cannot be simply imported. SEZs 
should be seen as experiments, i.e. successful elements are 
continued and enlarged, whereas unsuccessful approaches 
are changed or abandoned; they are no panacea for or 
shortcut to development. This should be properly 
communicated to avoid frustrations.  Indeed, SEZs need 
some time before they can contribute to the host country’s 
economy. Even in the case of China in the 1980s, the 
contribution of SEZs to the Chinese economy was only 1% 
of China’s GDP, but only since the early 1990s, the 
programme has led to an increase in FDI.  
Learning and adjustments will have to be given a chance. 
Also, African host governments should put their local 
investors as a top priority and have a long-term strategy in 
place of which SEZs form an integral part, rather than 
rushing to create enclaves for foreign investors. The 
fundamental goal of the establishment of SEZs is to improve 
the general investment conditions in African countries and 
this will take place when the host government has better 
infrastructure and technology, and educated and competent 
labour – and will need to keep an eye on implementation at 
lower administrative levels. The key to success is in the 
hands of the host governments. 
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  Table 1: Investment structure of SEZs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Bräutigam, D. and Tang. X. (2011) 'African Shenzhen: China's special economic zones in Africa', Journal of Modern African Studies 49
(1): 27-54.  
 
Country / SEZ 
Status as of early 
2013 
Ownership structure 
Egypt Suez Operational 
Tianjin TEDA, CAD fund, Egypt-china Corporation for Investment, 
Tianjin Suez International Cooperation share ownership 
Ethiopia Oriental Operational 
Consortium of Qiyuan Group, Jianglian and Yangyang Asset Man-
agement share ownership 
Zambia 
Chambishi Operational 5% holding through Zambian state owned, Zambia 
Consolidated Copper Mines Investment Holdings Lusaka Under construction 
Nigeria 
Lekki Under construction 
China-Africa Lekki Investment Co. Ltd 60% (a consortium of four 
Chinese companies) 
Lagos State Government 20%, Lekki Worldwide Investment Ltd 
20% (owned by Lagos State Government) 
Ogun- 
Guangdong 
Operational 
Ogun State Government 18%, Consortium of Guangdong Xinguang 
International Group, and China-Africa. Investment Ltd and CCNC 
Group 82% 
Mauritius Jin Fei 
Completed construction, 
not operating yet 
Taiyuan Iron and Steel 34%, Shanxi Coking Coal 21%, Tianli Enter-
prises Group 12.5% and CAD fund 32.5% 
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